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CHAPTER XXIX
COUNTER TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION:
In the previous chapter "Terrorism" was discussed in the most important
points in regards with the matter of terrorism. Now let us see what must be the
government's and the Security Forces answer to the threat of terrorism.
GENERAL FACTS:
There is no country in the world that does not have or could have the threat
of terrorism. The act of terrorism is very simple to carry out, but the operations
of counter terrorism are not so simple. Counter terrorism requires preparation,
training and a special execution: A failure will result in the loss of innocent
lives and possibly a victory for the terrorists. Above all, the counter terrorist
operations demand good military intelligence cooperation.
THE FIVE COMPONENTS OF A COUNTER TERRORIST PROGRAM:
a. In this space we will discuss the government actions against the
terrorist activities. Before we start to discuss the components of a counter
terrorist program we must mention the terrorists' goal and the fundamental threat
of terrorism to governments.
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1) Question: What is the terrorists' goal? And what is the government's
goal?
Answer: Terrorists wish to obtain the popular support for their
movement. The government wishes to keep the popular support on their side.
2) Question: Taking this terrorists' and government's goal into
consideration, Who could remember what is the fundamental threat of terrorism to
governments?
Answer: Terrorism will give the urban insurgent a method to develop the
potential for mass uprising and give the rural insurgent a method to oblige them
to reduce the control of the government and to force them into the desired
behavior.
b. A government's answer to the acts of terrorism could cause even more
problems if the government does not follow the procedures of a good program of
counter terrorism. For that reason it must analyze carefully the needs of a good
program of counter terrorism to avoid making exactly what the terrorists wish.
c. Basically, there are five components of the counter terrorism program:
1) PREDICTION: It includes the intelligence operations, and the work of
analyzing the threat, the terrorists' power, and the most vulnerable targets. Our
knowledge of the characteristics of terrorism and terrorism's strategy will be key
parts in this job. EXAMPLE:
"From our study of terrorism we know that there are many possible targets.
We also know that it is not possible to know WITH certainty what will be the next
terrorist's targets, but using our intelligence about the terrorists and their
goals, we could make a prediction about the most probable targets and this will
give us more possibility to protect these targets or react quickly against the
terrorists.
2) PREVENTION:
a. Eliminate the causes: It will not be possible to eliminate all the
terrorism causes, but at least a government that could show the population that
they are trying to better the society's condition will create an environment in
which it will be difficult for the terrorists to gain much popular support.
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b. DIPLOMACY: This will have much value because it will eliminate the
foreign support of terrorists and their sanctuary---but it is very difficult to
imagine that all governments will like to eliminate terrorism because some
governments are the biggest sponsors of terrorism. (What could give examples of
some countries that sponsor terrorism?)
3) DISSUASION: Block the target. Remember that terrorists like to attack
targets that are not protected. As we have discussed there are so many possible
targets for terrorists that we cannot get complete protection. But the analysis of
terrorists could show the most vulnerable targets and then we could give our
priority to those targets. Also, frequently, only in few security actions could
dissuade the terrorists.
a. Physical security
b. Personal security
c. Security Operations (OPSEC)
d. It is very possible that the best way to dissuade terrorists is to
find a high proportion of their detection, conviction and punishment.
4) PREPARATION: Preparing the government forces to react. INCLUDES:
a. Determining authority and jurisdiction
b. Planning the counter terrorism operations
c. Training the counter terrorism personnel
5) REACTION: The appropriate answer to the incident.
4. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER TERRORISM:
a. We already know the five components of a counter terrorism program. In
each one of the components the military intelligence actions are essential.
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b. FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE COUNTER TERRORISM
COMPONENTS:
1) Intelligence collection
2) Intelligence analysis
3) Intelligence dissemination
c. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES:
1) Initiate investigations
2) Confirm information
3) Obtain information sources
4) Give advice to the Commander
d. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE JURISDICTION:
1) Each country is different and you must study the laws of the
country in which you work.
e. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE NEEDS:
1) The military intelligence needs in regards to terrorism are infinite.
You need to obtain all the information possible about the terrorists, their
targets and the surroundings in which they operate.
f. The legal aspects in regards to the terrorism acts and terrorists have
to be considered taking into account that the terrorist is a criminal and that he
wishes that the authorities initiate repressive actions. This is one of the
tactics used by them to obtain a reaction to the government and therefore
strengthen their movement.
5. TAKING HOSTAGES AND THE RESCUE OPERATION:
Since hostage taking is the most difficult type of situation, we will
discuss a rescue operation in a hostage taking situation to show some details of
the government's reaction to the acts of terrorism.
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In this situation it is very important that the government have an
appropriate reaction. The use of too much force could be worst than any reaction.
Remember that often the terrorist's goal is to provoke the government to use
inappropriate force. This is especially important in hostage taking cases. In such
a situation the government will have to react very carefully to prevent that the
terrorists could attain their goals.
There are four rules for a rescue operation:
a. The objective is a rescue mission to save the lives of the hostages--
without giving into the impossible demands of the terrorists. In any action taken
by the security forces, this objective has importance, even when one has to escape
from some terrorists.
b. The rescue team must be of an adequate size and must only use adequate
arms to combat the situation. Having too many people in the rescue group will only
difficult the operation and give more targets to the terrorists. Always try to use
arms that are not lethal, if possible, to avoid killing the hostages.
c. It is important to obtain and use all the intelligence possible from
the terrorists, the hostages, the area, etc.
d. The rescue team must have a high degree of professionalism. It must be
well prepared to fulfill its mission.
NEGOTIATION WITH THE TERRORISTS:
a. In entering in negotiations or considering entering in negotiations
WITH the terrorists, the following are some options the government has:
1) Give into all the terrorists' demands
2) Deny all the terrorists' demands
3) Controlled negotiation so as to get additional time to take
appropriate actions.
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b. There are varied opinions and philosophies in regards to negotiations
with terrorists; the following are among them:
1) Not to negotiate under any conditions
2) To negotiate to obtain the freedom of the hostages
3) Negotiate WITH the purpose of gaining additional time to take
appropriate action.
CONCLUSION:
The counter terrorism operations are some of the most difficult and
frustrating to military personnel. But they are also some of the most common types
of operations today and could have great impact in the national life. It is
important for you, as members of military intelligence corps, to understand the
terrorist's operations their possible effects in the insurrection's war and the
counter terrorism programs that the governments could carry out to effectively
control the terrorist's threat.
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CHAPTER XXX
PHYSICAL SECURITY
INTRODUCTION:
Security, as we apply it to our classified information and defense material,
is a very complex theme. In order to better understand the complete theme of
security, we have subdivided the theme in three parts: PHYSICAL SECURITY, PERSONAL
SECURITY, and DOCUMENT AND INFORMATION SECURITY.
None of these three parts could exist by themselves. During the last
chapters we introduced the other two securities; personal and documents. In this
chapter we will discuss what is physical security in itself, but we wish that you
always keep in mind the other two securities so that you may be aware of the
relationship that exists between the three.
So that you may fulfill your security function, you may have to be better
prepared for the enemy.
GENERAL FACTS:
1. EXAMPLES OF SECURITY:
a. Physical
b. Personal and anti-terrorism
c. Information security
d. Operations security
e. Communications security
f. Transmissions security
2. DEFINITION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY:
Physical security is defined as "The barrier system that is placed between
the potential intruder and what you wish to protect. These barriers could be of
five types: (NATURAL, STRUCTURAL, HUMAN, ANIMAL, ENERGY)."
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a. NATURAL BARRIERS: Are those natural topographical characteristics such
as rivers, mountains, seas, ravines, cliffs, etc., that by themselves slow down or
difficult the entry or access of an intruder to an installation.
b. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS: Are those barriers constructed by man, without
consideration to its original intention, that could delay the intruder. Some
examples of structural barriers are: walls, floors, doors, windows, locks, fences,
etc.
c. HUMAN BARRIERS: The guards, managers in charge of lodging, office
workers and workshops workers who intercept the intruder and what he wishes to
protect.
d. ANIMAL BARRIERS:Generally dogs such as the German Shepherd, are
trained and used as guards.
e. ENERGY BARRIERS:Alarms, protective illumination, any electronic
devise that serves to protect an installation.
3. PRINCIPLES IN WHICH THE APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY IS BASED:
a. The enemy's agent must have access to the information or material that
interests him. The type of access depends in a number of factors, and could be
done in different ways:
1) When you are considering protecting information, you should not only
consider protecting the physical access, but the access to discussions about these
material through the use of clandestine devices to listen [bugs]. If the enemy
tries to tape a conversation about an specific theme, this is so useful to him as
the original document in paper.
2) You must be careful also WITH the use of long-range photographic
equipment to get access through openings in structures.
3) The themes discussed above could be considered also for sabotage. The
sabotage agent does not have to place the device or destructive material in the
place he wishes to cause damage. He could, in many ways, throw an explosive device
against its target, (riffle, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, camouflaged
explosives sent through the mail or WITH supplies), or could contaminate the fuel
or oil deposits to cause damage to machinery, although they keep away from him.
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4) You may consider all available resources that the enemy could access,
and all these must be evaluated to determine how we could be able to counter
arrest it.
b. IS THERE ANY IMPENETRABLE BARRIER?
1) ANSWER: There is no barrier that is impenetrable. If a hostile
government is set to dedicate sufficient time, money, personnel, materials and
imagination to cross a barrier, they may succeed.
c. SECURITY WITH DELAY DEFENSE SYSTEM:
1) Although no barrier could totally exclude an intruder, it could give a
determinate delay time. It all depends upon the intruder's ability.
2) Instead of trying the exclusion through the use of just one barrier,
the security could be based in a security in-depth system or accumulated delay.
3) To get optimum results it is necessary to add barrier over barrier,
delay over delay, until sufficient delay time is accumulated that will allow us to
control any possible penetration. This delay should be enough so that the
available personnel could neutralize the intruder.
4) A fence without guards allows a short delay. If that fence is
patrolled by trustworthy guards that keep it under observation within the delay
time, the total delay time increases significantly.
5) In some cases it is necessary to differentiate between the need of
denying access and the need to have knowledge that access has been gained. This
refers to the neutralization, if a material is committed, you may take action to
void its value for the enemy.
6) Physical security must be applied not just as a dissuasive means
against the stealing property but also as a dissuasive means against espionage.
7) The spy only partially satisfies his purpose when he acquires
information. Information looses value if the persons responsible for its custody
know about the leak. Espionage does not have any value if it is revealed.
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8) These considerations make the surreptitious entry the greatest danger
from the CI's point of view. This makes the creation of two types of barriers
necessary. One to protect those things that could be stolen and could not be
neutralized and another to protect those things that could be neutralized.
9) To protect those things that could be neutralized a barrier that shows
evidence of having penetrated is created. Example: (Broken window, etc.).
d. Each installation must be treated as an individual entity when
planning security. The location of an installation alone will bring problems that
differ from those aspects of other installations. Each one must be considered as a
separate problem.
4. PHYSICAL SECURITY ASPECTS:
DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENT BARRIERS:
a. NATURAL BARRIERS
1) ADVANTAGES OF NATURAL BARRIERS
a) They provide a protection system without additional cost to the
installation.
b) The difficulty to penetrate an installation increases according to the
barrier.
2) DISADVANTAGES OF NATURAL BARRIERS:
a) Trees, ravines, vegetation, could serve as a hiding place to any
possible intruder.
b) Installations that have as barrier a body of water could be subject to
penetration through a team of divers.
3) BODIES OF WATER AS BARRIERS:
a) ADVANTAGES:
(1) When the surface of the water is calm, it offers the guards or
security personnel a very extensive field view range.
(2) Water offers much resistance to a vehicle used by intruders by
making it almost impossible to have rapid access to the installation.
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(3) To gain access, the task of hiding a vehicle or boat without
been detected by the guards or security personnel will be an obstacle to the
intruder.
b) DISADVANTAGES:
(1) When the water is agitated it reduces the field of vision of the
guards or security personnel.
(2) It is possible to control the movement of a vehicle or boat to
keep it hidden between waves.
(3) The surface of the water reflects the light given by the
illumination system. An intruder may use this situation in their favor when trying
to penetrate an installation.
4) THE LAND AS BARRIER:
a) The land where the installation sits must be evaluated and considered
as much from the surface access point of view as from below the surface.
b) Points to consider when evaluating the land as barrier:
(1) The looser the ground the more noise it will cause when the
intruder walks.
(2) Muddy soil without vegetation is very difficult to cross and at
the same time the intruder leaves their footprints.
(3) Light colored soil provides reflection and contrast so as to
allow the most efficient use of natural and artificial illumination.
(4) Land that is uneven such as cliffs and ravines are difficult to
cross and limit the amount of equipment and material that the intruder could
introduce in the exterior perimeter area.
b. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS:
1) As explained earlier, structural barriers are man-made constructions.
To remove the vegetation around an installation is also considered as an
structural barrier.
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2) FENCES: Fences are independent structures, generally in a vertical
plane, designed for the physical and or visual control of access to external
areas.
a) General facts about fences:
(1) Define the area they protect
(2) Reduce the number of guards required and facilitate the tasks of
the patrol corps.
(3) Cause delay in case of an intent to penetrate
(4) Although they don't deny the access in themselves, they are a
psychological obstacle to a possible intruder
(5) They deny accidental access to innocent persons to the protected
area
(6) They help control the flow of vehicles towards those entrances
controlled by guards
3) TWO TYPES OF FENCES:
a) SOLID: They are used to deny visual and physical access to non-
authorized persons. The materials normally used are bricks, concrete, wooden
boards, stone, etc.
(1) ADVANTAGES OF SOLID FENCES:
(a) They are useful when you wish to hide certain activities within the
installation.
(b) They avoid the possibility of passing small items through the fence.
(c) They could be built in such manner that it would be difficult to cross
them without being detected.
(d) For the most part, fences are built of stone, brick and concrete and
they extend below the ground and make it difficult to the intruder to penetrate
below.
(2) DISADVANTAGES OF SOLID FENCES:
(a) It is difficult to illuminate the zone around the installation because
of the shadow caused by the fence.
(b) They do not allow patrols within the installation to observe the
activities in the external perimeter.
(c) The installations that use solid fences have guards in towers. Tower
guards are a disadvantage in itself. The towers confine the guard in a very
limited area. Since the guard cannot move for a long time in the tower he does not
stay alert.
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b) COMPLETE VISION FENCES: Are built in such manner that they al]ow
visual observation through the entire fence. It is designed only for the control
of physical access between two areas.
(1) ADVANTAGES OF COMPLETE VISION FENCES:
(a) They allow the effective use of illumination since
they do not cast a shadow.
(b) They allow the effective use of guard patrol, since
they could keep the installation's surrounding area in watch.
(2) DISADVANTAGES: They allow a possible intruder to carry out a
reconnaissance of the camp and could establish the installation's pattern of
internal security guards.
3) PENETRATION: It is the main objective of all enemy or terrorist to
attain access to the internal perimeter of an installation to carry out his
mission.
4) THREE WAYS OF PASSING THE FENCES:
a) ON TOP: Most fences are not high and are easy to climb.
b) THROUGH THE MATERIAL: (If it is not a solid fence).
Many fences are built in such manner that it is easy to break or
separate them in such manner that it will allow the enemy's access without leaving
evidence that there was a penetration.
c) BELOW: If the fence is solid and very high, digging and
penetrating below is possible.
5) CHARACTERISTICS OF FENCES:
a) The minimum height of a fence is eight (8) feet. This is due to
the consideration that an average man could jump or climb that height.
b) It must be extended below the ground level.
c) If it does not extend below the ground level, the minimum space
between fences and the ground must not be over two inches.
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d) Support posts:
(1) Wood: Must be the best wood quality and measure at least 4
inches wide.
(2) Metal: Must be at least 2 inches in diameter. They must be
placed over concrete or firm ground at a depth of three feet.
e) Protection - Upper part of the fence:
(1) All fences must have in the upper part, additional
obstacles that could prevent or delay the enemy's penetration.
(2) Complete vision fences:
(a) Barbed wires are placed in metal arms that extend
outward, at a 45 degree angle.
(b) Place barbed wires in metal arms in "V" shape.
(c) The arms must be two feet long WITH three rows of
barbed wire over them.
(d) You may also use folding wiring.
(3) Solid Fences:
(a) You may use the same system as complete vision.
(b) You may add glass in the upper part.
(c) You may place sharp metal bars.
(4) DISADVANTAGES: You must understand that the barbed wire
system in the upper part of a fence does not completely prevent an intruder s
entry. What this system provides is delay to the intruder and is another obstacle
that he should pass through.
f) GATES IN THE FENCES: The number of gates in a fence must be limited to
the minimum necessary for the efficient and safe operation of an installation.
Although all the gates must have the ability to be locked, when locked they must
provide the same level of security that the fence itself provides. When there is
considerable traffic on foot and vehicles it is preferable to provide separate
gates for each type.
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g) OPENING IN THE FENCES: All the openings within or below the fence
(gully, sewage) that measures over 96 square inches must be sealed in such manner
that they could only be penetrated from within. In the case of rivers or ravines
that flow in the surroundings of the fence do not allowed this to extend over the
water and it must be built parallel to the ditch. In case that fences are built
through rivers or ravines, these must be dug to the river bed so as to avoid
penetrations below the water.
h) MULTIPLE FENCES: Multiple fences are formed by two or more parallel
fences used in conjunction to form a perimeter barrier. In addition to increasing
the delay time, they tend to trap the intruder and prevents our personnel from
accidentally coming in contact WITH the alarms or security measures imposed around
the fence.
(1) The minimum rules for a fence also apply to each multiple fence
unit.
(2) The multiple fences must be at least 10 feet away.
(3) The maximum distance allowed between two fences is determined by
the ground, the illumination, and the guard's abilities, but it must not exceed
150 feet.
(4) A greater distance than this, prevents the fences from being
completed and could be attacked by the intruder as they treat it as a separate
obstacle.
6) CLEAR ZONES: The clear zones is the area of the external or internal
perimeter of the installation which is free of obstacles, structures and
vegetation.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLEARED ZONE:
a) Must extend throughout a minimum of 20 feet in the external perimeter
of the installation.
b) Must extend throughout a minimum of 50 feet in the internal perimeter
of the installation.
c) Must remain free of vegetation, structures, trash or any other
material that could allow the enemy to use it as hiding place.
d) There should be no trees next to a fence. The enemy could use a tree
to reconnoiter the installation and to try the access over the fence.
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e) It is important to keep the grass mowed around the cleared zone so
that there will be no possible hiding place for the enemy.
f) Do not use the cleared zone as a storage area.
g) If you do not have an adequate cleared zone, you must increase the
height of the fence.
h) If a fence is used to protect a large area, if possible, build a
perimeter road that allows the car patrols and the quick delivery of
reinforcements to any point of the fence.
c. HUMAN BARRIERS: (THE GUARDS AND THE GUARD SYSTEMS)
1) The physical security depends upon the use of guard systems in such a
way that natural and structural barriers could be used to control and avoid the
access of non-authorized personnel.
2) The guard system is the most important element of the security program
of an installation.
3) FOUR BASIC FUNCTIONS OF THE GUARD SYSTEM:
a) Detect the intruders
b) Sound an alarm
c) Capture non-authorized personnel
d) Identify authorized personnel
4) TWO GUARD CATEGORIES:
a) Those whose only mission is to serve as guards in the
installation. These men are trained specifically to carry out this task.
b) Those who carry out this task as a punishment or as additional
task of their normal work, or it is the job that they have been properly trained
for.
5) RECRUITING THE GUARDS: Due to the important role that they play,
security guards must be very carefully chosen.
ELEMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN SELECTING GUARDS:
a) Experience
b) Training
c) Must be strong
d) Must be in good physical health
e) Must be trustworthy
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6) TRAINING THE GUARDS:
THEMES TO INCLUDE IN TRAINING:
a) A general orientation that includes the orders and the authority
b) Instructions about the traffic control
c) Riot control
d) Personal defense
e) Arms handling including maintenance and security
f) First aid
g) Communications
h) Use of special arms
i) Plans and emergency procedures
j) Counter espionage
k) Counter sabotage
NOTE: The responsibility of the training generally falls upon one of the
members of greater seniority of the guard's forces.
7) THE USE OF GUARDS:
a) The guards' barracks must be located where they could enforce maximum
control over the guard's posts and the sensitive areas. They must use the
following rules:
(1) In small installations WITH one only entrance, the barrack must
be near the entrance.
(2) In large installations a centrally located barrack is preferable
to facilitate the quick deployment to any dangerous point.
b) For the perimeter's security, the most effective use of guards is in
fixed points that support themselves mutually. These require that each guard be
visible to the one next to him, sharing therefore the responsibility of the area
they protect. These posts must also be protected by the elements; such as: wind,
rain, cold weather and the sun.
c) It is less costly to use the guards on foot or mounted guards. The
guards could verify the barriers at irregular intervals and will make it more
difficult for the intruder to penetrate the barrier.
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d) No matter what method you use for the guard's service you must prepare
orders for each post and patrol. These must:
(1) Must be brief and easy to understand
(2) Include instructions about all the possible contingencies in
regards to actions during emergency situations
e) A guard must have sufficient time to rest if the job must be done
effectively. Must, at least, be relieved every eight (8) hours. The guards in
fixed posts must be relieved each four (4) hours.
8) SUPERVISION OF THE GUARDS:
a) The continuous supervision is necessary to make sure that the guards
are in their posts and carrying out their security tasks. The supervisors must
keep in contact WITH each post, at least four (4) times a day.
b) A characteristic guard force must consist of:
(1) A commander
(2) His assistant
(3) Administrative personnel
c) If guard services are given 24 hours, three shifts must be needed.
Each shift has a similar organization.
d) The supervision starts WITH a personal inspection of all the guards
before the start of their shift. Each inspection includes:
(1) Personal appearance
(2) The equipment
(3) Knowledge of special orders
9) THE GUARDS' EQUIPMENT:
a) Distinctive uniform
b) Credentials and or appropriate identification as a guard.
c) Appropriate arm
d) Additional equipment: notebook, whistles, flashlights
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10) COMMUNICATIONS AMONG GUARDS:
a) Fixed posts and patrols joined by a communications network.
b) Direct telephone may be used.
c) Portable radio.
d) Emergency communications depend on messengers.
e) The vehicles must be equipped WITH radio-transmitters,
receivers.
f) The central station must be in charge of a supervisor.
g) The patrols on foot could use radios.
d. ANIMAL BARRIERS:
1) An animal barrier consists of an animal that is used as guard system.
2) In theory, you may use many types of animals but we have limited the
use to a dog, almost exclusively a German Shepherd.
ADVANTAGES OF USING DOGS AS BARRIERS:
1) Their sense of smell and hearing are much more developed than in
humans.
2) They have an incorruptible character.
3) They are loyal.
4) They are plunderers by instinct, their qualities as guards are natural
in him, and take precedence over their own welfare.
5) The man-dog team is the most effective method in the use of dogs as
guards.
6) You may place dogs in open areas where it is necessary to limit
movement.
DISADVANTAGES:
1) They lose their effectiveness if they work where there are many
people.
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2) You could not use it near a road, since the traffic noise will
distract him and cause him to lose concentration and effectiveness.
3) They must work at least 75 to 100 yards from a road, or from areas
with frequent traffic.
e. ENERGY BARRIERS:
1) An energy barrier is the use of mechanical, electric, or
electronic energy to prevent or alert about an intruder-s entry.
2) Two important energy barriers are:
a) Protective illumination systems
b) Protective alarm systems
3) PROTECTIVE ILLUMINATION:
a) It is used to increase the guards- field of vision, providing a visual
field during the night in areas of poor or any natural light.
b) DISTINCTION OF SILHOUETTES:
(1) When the possible intruder uses dark clothes, he may hide behind the
structure-s shadows. To aid the guard in distinguishing these silhouettes you may:
(a) Direct additional illumination to the structure-s grounds and
walls.
(b) You may paint stripes or angles on the walls, fences and
structures, that will allow the guard to detect movement.
c) ILLUMINATION OF ENTRANCES: This is a special task since:
(1) Provides illumination to:
(a) Inspection of passes
(b) Inspection of Identification cards or badges
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(c) Inspection of vehicles
(d) Inspections of trucks and loads
(e) Illumination of the area surrounding the sentry box
(2) There must be illumination in an area approximately 50 feet around the
sentry box, 25 feet as a minimum.
(3) The area inside the sentry box must be kept as dark as possible. In
that manner the guard could see the persons, and the persons could not see who is
the guard, nor how many guards there are inside the sentry box.
d) SENTRY TOWERS:
(1) The sentry towers must not be over 1,000 feet of distance
from one another. The reason for this is that a person WITH normal vision only has
a field of vision of 500 feet in which he could distinguish silhouettes.
(2) The sentry towers must have flood lights, in addition of
providing illumination, they must also blind and surprise the intruder,
disorganizing therefore the possible attack plan.
e) ILLUMINATION OF VITAL AREAS:
(1) Examples of vital areas:
(a) Communications
(b) Warfare equipment
(c) Water tanks
(d) Energy plant
(2) The vital areas that are considered vulnerable from a
large distance must be kept dark.
(3) Vital areas that are vulnerable at short distance must be
kept well illuminated.
(4) Other areas that must be kept well illuminated are:
(a) Inactive areas: where there is no night work, areas
that provide hiding places to intruders.
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(b) Buildings: Illumination around the buildings is
necessary to avoid that intruders come in through low windows on the first floor.
(c) Parking area: In addition to providing a good
hiding place to the intruder, is a good area for assault to employees of the
installation.
f) EMERGENCY ILLUMINATION:
(1) There must be an independent-backup system of illumination
when the normal energy source is interrupted. This may be:
(a) A system of floodlights that operate on batteries.
(b) A generator
(c) A central battery system
5. PERSONNEL CONTROL AND IDENTIFICATION:
a. IDENTIFICATION:
1) The most effective manner will be if the guards could
personally recognize all the persons authorized to enter the installation.
2) A modified identification system could be used only at the
military installations where only military personnel work. A commander could take
his unit to the door and become responsible for them.
3) The artificial identification is the most widely used at
present. The authorized personnel receives passes or cards where access to a
determined installation or activity is authorized. These could be falsified and
therefore they must be laminated and prepared WITH a complex background so as to
make falsifying difficult.
4) They must have the photograph of the person, name, and
date of birth, height, weight, hair color, color of eyes, sex, name of the
installation, rank, title, and signature of the authorizing official.
5) When artificial identification is used, this must execute
a rigid control over the devices used.
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b. USING THE ARTIFICIAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM:
1) The employee receives a card or identification that they keep.
When they enter the installation they show the card and come in. This system is
used widely but it has its flaws. These are the loss of cards and possible
falsifications.
2) In another system, two cards WITH the same information is
prepared.
a) When the person comes to the installation, they give the
card that he keeps and he receives another one to be used inside the installation.
If one of the two has been altered, the guard could detect the change when he has
the two cards in his hands.
6. CONTROL OF VISITING PERSONS:
a. The control over the visitors depends in how sensitive the
installation is.
b. Possible visitor's controls:
1) Escorts
2) Programmed visits
3) Visitor's registry
4) Passes for visitors
7. CONTROL OF PACKAGES:
a. You must provide for the search of packages that come in or that
are taken out of an installation.
b. If necessary, you may prohibit carrying packages to the
installation all together.
8. PHOTOGRAPHS:
a. You must be careful in the areas where classified material is
kept to avoid the taking of non-authorized photographs.
b. Generally, only photographers authorized by the information
office, or by the commander of the installation could carry cameras to the
sensitive areas.
9. VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION CONTROL:
a. Jointly WITH the personnel control, there must be a control of
vehicles.
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b. An identification system which identifies the vehicles WITH
authorized access to the installation.
c. It is required that the entire personnel registers their
vehicles WITH the guard's general headquarters.
d. When the registry is done, you may give the vehicle's owner a
decal that must be placed in the vehicle's windshield.
e. The declass must be renewed annually and must be rigidly
controlled.
10. FIRE-FIGHTING INSTALLATIONS:
a. Fire is one of the most effective tools used by the sabotage
teams.
b. Without knowing the cause, a fire could neutralize an
installation completely.
c. The security program must include the adequate installations to
fight fires and a program for the prevention of fires.
d. COMPONENTS OF A FIRE-FIGHTING INSTALLATION:
1) PERSONNEL: They may civilians or military men. They must be trained
adequately in combat and fire prevention.
2) ORGANIZATION: It is a function of engineers. The engineer of
an installation serves as commander of the firemen's corps.
3) THE EQUIPMENT: The firemen's ability depends upon the equipment they
have. To determine the type of equipment necessary, you must understand the
classification of the fires:
a) CLASS A: Are those which consist of common fuels such as wood,
paper, and similar materials. Water is the best element to fight such type of
fire.
b) CLASS B: Are those of the oil or gas type. Water does not work
to put out this type, since water spreads this type of fire. Carbon dioxide is
appropriately used to put out this type of fires. Foam extinguishers are
recommended.
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4) ALARMS: There are two types of alarms: Central and local. They could
be automatic and manual. Their placement serves to alert the fire fighters corps
and the personnel at the same time.
5) RESERVE FORCES: It is advisable to have a reserve force that consists
of personnel trained in the same manner as the main corps.
6) PREVENTION OF FIRES: The entire personnel in an installation has the
obligation to participate in a prevention program. You must have a training
program so that everyone is conscious of their responsibilities.
7) PLANS IN CASE OF FIRES: You must prepare specific instructions for the
entire personnel. You assign specific responsibilities to the entire personnel
that is present at the time the fire breaks out.
11. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. A security program must include provisions about communications
security.
b. The communications center must be designed as a restricted area
and must enforce strict control over the access to this area.
c. The communications center must be located in an area or building
that could be easily defended, WITH some type of protection against aerial
attacks.
d. The maintenance and service personnel have a very sensitive
position and therefore must have the security authorization according to the
sensitivity of the installation.
12. GENERAL SERVICES:
a. There must be provisions that guarantee that electricity and
water services are protected adequately and there are emergency sources available:
1) ELECTRICITY: If an installation has its own energy plant this
must be located in a restricted area and only authorized personnel should be
allowed inside. A barricade system must be built to prevent the entrance of non-
authorized personnel.
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2) WATER: If the installation has its own fire fighting station,
you must give the same protection as to the energy plant. You must protect the
water from contaminations.
SUMMARY:
We have discussed some of the measures that could apply in an installation
or activity to prevent non-authorized access to these. You must not suppose that
these are the only available measures when making a recommendation to a commander
during the course of an inspection or carrying out a study of physical security.
The minimum rules that have been presented are preferred but are not always
possible. Frequently, you may improvise to compensate for the lack of security
that results when the minimum rules are not carried out.
Keep in mind that there is not such thing as an impenetrable barrier. One
must not depend solely upon natural and structural barriers. The key to the good
functioning of any security system is personal efficiency. The barriers that are
used only serve to improve the effectiveness of the guards and make the detection
of intruders more possible.
The physical security is not the only answer to the commander's problems in
regards to security. Unless he has a good personnel security program and a good
information security program he would not be successful in his intents to
safeguard the information and the classified material of his installation. If
there is a flaw in the security system, the intruder takes the necessary key to
neutralize the whole security program. Remember this when analyzing an
installation during a security inspection.
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Annex A
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